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THE EMERGING TREND OF EXTENDING ADA
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION BEYOND THE
WORKPLACE TO INCLUDE COMMUTING ISSUES:
A COMMENT ON COLWELL V. RITE AID
By Frederick J. Melkey1

I. Introduction
A. Colwell v. Rite Aid Breaks New Ground
The Americans with Disability Act2
(“ADA”) requires an employer to provide reasonable
accommodation to an employee or job applicant with
a disability, unless doing so would cause significant
difficulty or expense for the employer.3 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
describes a reasonable accommodation as “any
change in the work environment (or in the way things are
usually done) to help a person with a disability apply
for a job, perform the duties of a job, or enjoy the
benefits and privileges of employment.”4 Historically,
employers have understood that the scope of a
“reasonable accommodation” is limited to the
workplace.5 As one court stated, “[w]hile an employer
is required to provide reasonable accommodations
that eliminate barriers in the work environment, an
employer is not required to eliminate those barriers
which exist outside the work environment.”6
Last year, the Third Circuit broke with
historical precedent in the case of Colwell v. Rite
Aid Corp.7 It stated that the ADA “does not strictly
limit the breadth of reasonable accommodations to
address only those problems that an employee has
in performing her work that arise once she arrives
at the workplace.”8 Colwell was in direct conflict with
a Third Circuit unpublished decision by a different
three judge panel.9 This result led to concern within
the employer community about judicial expansion of
the reasonable accommodation requirement under
the ADA.10 Fueling employer concerns is a new
unpublished decision in the Ninth Circuit, Livingston
v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc.11 which favorably cites Colwell,
and also finds that the employer needs to consider
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a reasonable accommodation for the non-workplace
commute.
Colwell has drawn limited commentary
from the academic community. Professor Sullivan
mentions in a blog posting that Colwell may implicate
the existing EEOC guidance that the ADA does
not require an employer to make accommodations
primarily for the employee’s personal benefit.12 As
he points out, “getting to work is not exactly for
personal benefit, but both cases [Colwell and a 1995
case which it cites] illustrate the occasional difficulty
of drawing the work/personal line. Certainly, many
employers view their workers’ commutation as their
own responsibility.”13
This paper recommends that although much
of the case law14 has not interpreted the reasonable
accommodation provision of the ADA as broadly as
Colwell, the holding and reasoning should be adopted
by other circuits. Both legislative history and public
policy reasons militate in favor of this approach. Much
like the courts chipped away at the ADA’s definition
of a “person with a disability,” narrowing it to the
point it required Congress to enact amendments in
2008 to overturn Supreme Court precedent,15 the
courts have been similarly limiting the interpretation
of “reasonable accommodation.” I promote a return
to requiring employers and employees to engage in
the interactive process envisioned by the ADA in
circumstances similar to those in Colwell. A broader
reading of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
requirements would not be judicial expansion, but a
return to both the original meaning of the Act and the
intent of Congress when it enacted the ADA twenty
years ago. To that end, Colwell is not really breaking
new ground; it is replacing the divot16 made by courts as
they have taken repeated swings at the statute.
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B. A Summary of the Original and Continuing need
for the ADA
People with disabilities have endured an
inferior economic position in American society.17
Before passage of the ADA in 1990
[T]wo out of every three disabled
Americans of working-age were not
employed, and two of three who
were not working wanted to be, the
income of disabled workers was
about thirty six percent less than
that of their nondisabled counterparts, and in 1984 fifty percent of
adults with disabilities had household incomes of $15,000 or less,
compared to only twenty-five percent of non-disabled adults.18
Many of these trends continue to this day.
In November of 2010, more than two out of three
working-age people with disabilities were still not
employed; those without disabilities were employed at
roughly twice that rate.19 As the Department of Labor
recently articulated in a news release seeking public
input on ways to strengthen disability regulations
…the rate of disabled people who
are unemployed or not in the labor
force remain[s] significantly higher
than those without disabilities.
According to recent data from the
U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 21.7 percent of
people with disabilities were in the
labor force in June 2010, compared
with 70.5 percent of people with
no disability. In addition, the unemployment rate for those with disabilities was 14.4 percent, compared
with 9.4 percent unemployment for
those without a disability.
“Work is central to every person’s
financial independence, sense of
self and integrity,” said OFCCP
Director Patricia A. Shiu.20
This poor experience of the disabled in the
workplace can not be explained solely by the types of
prejudice encountered by racial and ethnic minorities,
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women, and the elderly.21 Many disabilities prevent
effective performance in a broad variety of jobs.22
Moreover, employers may find it efficient to refuse
to hire anyone with particular disabilities regardless
of their ability to do the job because employers have
structured their work processes and physical facilities
for the average non-disabled worker.23 “The lowering
of this type of barrier to the equal participation
of individuals in the workforce requires regulation
beyond the mere condemnation of unequal treatment
on the basis of disability as a suspect, protected
class.”24 Instead, it requires the employers make
accommodations for the disabled in the workplace.
How far the employer must go to make reasonable
accommodations is a policy choice with many facets.25
II. The History of Workplace Disability
Legislation
A. The Precursor to the ADA: The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973
In its first significant treatment of how far
employers must go to provide accommodation for
disabled employees, Congress stopped short of
imposing obligations on private employers that could
not pass the costs along to the federal government.26
The Rehabilitation Act of 197327 made the policy
choice that those accommodation costs be assessed
upon federal sector employers, federal contractors,
and other employers receiving federal financial
assistance.28
“The 1973 Act, in addition to increasing
funding for vocational rehabilitation, sought to
eradicate discriminatory and other barriers to the hiring
of disabled workers.”29 Part of the purpose stated in
the statute is “to ensure that the Federal Government
plays a leadership role in promoting the employment
of individuals with disabilities, especially individuals
with significant disabilities, and in assisting States and
providers of services in fulfilling the aspirations of
such individuals with disabilities for meaningful and
gainful employment and independent living.”30
“Section 501 imposes affirmative action
obligations on federal agencies. Section 502 seeks to
remove physical barriers in federal buildings. Section
503 levies affirmative action duties on all federal
contractors with contracts in excess of $10,000. These
duties extend to all of the contractors’ operations.”31
23

Section 504 prohibits federal programs and any
program or activity receiving federal funding assistance
from discriminating against “otherwise qualified
individual[s] with a disability . . . solely by reason of
her or his disability.”32 Thus, the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 goes beyond the neutral treatment of people
with disabilities to require something more to ensure
opportunities in employment.
B. ADA: The American’s with Disabilities Act of 1990
“Congress rarely writes on a clean slate,
and the ADA is no exception to this rule. Congress
drew heavily on section 504 and its regulations when
enacting the ADA.”33 Seventeen years after enacting
the Rehabilitation Act, Congress took the next step
of imposing similar obligations on all but the smallest
private employers by enacting the Americans with
Disabilities Act.34 Supreme Court Justice Stevens
noted
The ADA was passed by large
majorities in both Houses of Congress after decades of deliberation
and investigation into the need
for comprehensive legislation to
address discrimination against persons with disabilities. In the years
immediately preceding the ADA’s
enactment, Congress held 13 hearings and created a special task force
that gathered evidence from every
State in the Union. The conclusions
Congress drew from this evidence
are set forth in the task force and
Committee Reports, described in
lengthy legislative hearings, and
summarized in the preamble to
the statute. Central among these
conclusions was Congress’ finding
that “individuals with disabilities
are a discrete and insular minority
who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to
a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in
our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of
such individuals and resulting from
24

stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability
of such individuals to participate in,
and contribute to, society.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(7).
Invoking “the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment
and to regulate commerce,” the
ADA is designed “to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” §§ 12101(b)(1), (b)(4). It
forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major
areas of public life: employment,
which is covered by Title I of the
statute; public services, programs,
and activities, which are the subject
of Title II; and public accommodations, which are covered by Title
III.35
Also key within the employment context is
that the ADA defines a “qualified individual with a
disability” to mean “an individual with a disability
who, with or without a reasonable accommodation can
perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.”36 It
also expressly includes as a category of discrimination
“not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of the business
of such covered entity.”37 As such, the ADA “clearly
seems to require employers something more than
formally neutral treatment.”38
C. ADAAA: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008
The ADA Amendments Act of 200839
(ADAAA) is the most recent legislative response to
the issues people with disabilities face. The ADAAA
“represents a fairly dramatic change in disability
law.”40 As Professor Long observes, many of the
objectives of the ADA were never realized
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When the first President Bush signed
the original Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) into law in 1990, he
said it was time “to rejoice in and
celebrate another ‘Independence
Day,’ one that is long overdue.” For
the 43 million Americans with disabilities, the ADA was supposed to
represent the opening of doors that
had long been closed. Employers,
state and local governments, and
private businesses—from bowling
alleys to restaurants—would now be
required to make reasonable modifications to their facilities, policies,
and procedures in order to allow full
participation by individuals with disabilities. In short, expectations for
the ADA were high.
This probably explains why the
ADA is viewed so widely by disability rights advocates and its original
authors as such a huge disappointment, especially in the employment
context. Studies consistently reveal
that, despite the ADA, employees
who claim to be the victims of disability discrimination in the workplace face long odds. . . .
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sets
out to address some of the more controversial and
problematic aspects of the definition of disability 41
The ADAAA is a legislative response to
years of judicial narrowing of that definition as it
specifically abrogates several Supreme Court rulings.42
The statute indicates that the purpose is to “carry
out the ADA’s objectives of providing ‘a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination’ and ‘clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination’
by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be
available under the ADA”43 This expanded definition
of disability means that more people will be able to
pass the initial coverage threshold, and be able to
enter the interactive process in which an employer
must consider reasonable accommodations.44
One issue that has recently divided the
circuit courts is whether an employer must provide
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a reasonable accommodation to an individual that it
merely “regards as” having a disability.45 “The Act
provides that employers and other covered entities
‘need not provide a reasonable accommodation or
a reasonable modification to policies, practices, or
procedures to an individual who meets’ the ‘regarded
as’ definition. Thus, the new amendments effectively
end the ongoing dispute among the courts on this
issue.” 46 Congress did not address other aspects of
reasonable accommodations.
III. Defining a “Reasonable” Accommodation
A. Statutory Overview
Since Colwell is in the employment context,
this paper focuses on the meaning of a Reasonable
Accommodation within Title I of the ADA.47
“One of the most elusive concepts in the ADA is
that of ‘reasonable accommodation’ in the context
of employment.”48 There are several sections and
definitions of terms that must be read together to
establish the standard for providing a reasonable
accommodation.
To avoid discriminating against a qualified
person with a disability, the text of the statute requires
that the employer “mak[e] reasonable accommodations
to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is
an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity.”49 The definitions
section provides some clues to the meaning of this
passage. First, it defines a “qualified individual”
as “an individual who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the employment position that such individual holds
or desires.”50 However, the very next sentence of
the statute provides a surprise. “The ADA does not
define ‘reasonable accommodation.’ Instead, it lists
examples of what the term may include.”51
The term “reasonable accommodation” may include—
(A) making existing facilities used by
employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities; and
25

(B) job restructuring, part-time
or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment
or devices, appropriate adjustment
or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies,
the provision of qualified readers
or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals
with disabilities.52

The term “undue hardship” means
an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered
in light of the factors set forth in
subparagraph (B).

While the accommodations in sub-paragraph
A require physical changes to the workplace, those
in sub-paragraph B are mandatory departures from
neutral employer practices.53 As Professor Weber
observes

(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;

In the text of the ADA, Congress buttressed its requirement
that employers depart from otherwise neutral rules by prohibiting
standards, criteria, or methods of
administration that have the effect
of discriminating on the basis of
disability, as well as by outlawing
qualification standards, employment
tests, or other selection criteria that
tend to screen out persons with disabilities unless the standard, test, or
other criterion is shown to be jobrelated and consistent with business
necessity. So not only may a variance
or departure from an otherwise neutral rule or practice be required as a
matter of reasonable accommodation, but also the neutral rule itself
may be illegal when applied to an
applicant or employee with a disability if it has a discriminatory effect or
unjustified negative impact.54
Another key part of understanding the duty to
provide a reasonable accommodation is the limitation
is that it must fall below the threshold of an undue
hardship. “Unlike reasonable accommodation, ‘undue
hardship’ receives a statutory definition.”55 It includes
not only a definition, but also a detailed list of factors
to consider when making the determination.
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(B) Factors to be considered
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a covered entity, factors
to be considered include—

(ii) the overall financial resources
of the facility or facilities involved
in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such
facility; the effect on expenses and
resources, or the impact otherwise
of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources
of the covered entity; the overall
size of the business of a covered
entity with respect to the number of
its employees; the number, type, and
location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and
functions of the workforce of such
entity; the geographic separateness,
administrative, or fiscal relationship
of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.56
Reading these portions of the statute together,
“[t]he text and structure of the statute suggest a
substantial obligation to provide accommodation
up to the limit of hardship demonstrated by the
employer.”57
B. EEOC Interpretation
Under the familiar Chevron doctrine, courts
must grant deference to the EEOC’s interpretation
of the ADA where it is reasonable.58 “With regard to
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reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, the
EEOC regulations for Title I of the ADA repeat the
prohibition in the statute, stating that it is unlawful
for covered entities to fail to make reasonable
accommodations unless they can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the business operations of the employer.”59
Without providing a more detailed definition or
factors to consider, “[l]ike the statute, the regulations
rely more on example or typology than definition
when discussing reasonable accommodation.”60 The
EEOC regulations state that
[t]he term reasonable accommodations means: (i) [m]odifications or
adjustments to a job application
process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified
applicant desires; or (ii) [m]odifications or adjustments to the work
environment, or the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily
performed, that enable a qualified
individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that
position; or (iii) [m]odifications or
adjustments that enable a covered
entity’s employee with a disability to
enjoy equal benefits and privileges
of employment as are enjoyed by its
other similarly situated employees
without disabilities.
The regulations save their definitional language for undue hardship,
and essentially track the statute
when they provide the definition.
The regulations specifically list difficulties imposed on co-workers,
not as part of what may make an
accommodation unreasonable, but
as part of what may make hardship
undue for the employer.61
The EEOC Interpretative Guidance does
go a bit deeper and provides additional examples and
categories of possible accommodations.
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There are a number of possible
reasonable accommodations that
an employer may have to provide
in connection with modifications
to the work environment or adjustments in how and when a job is performed. These include:
• making existing facilities accessible;
• job restructuring;
• part-time or modified work schedules;
• acquiring or modifying equipment;
• changing tests, training materials,
or policies;
• providing qualified readers or
interpreters; and
• reassignment to a vacant position.62
The Interpretive Guidance goes further in
describing the requirements related to modifying
work schedules as a reasonable accommodation in
question and answer format with three examples of
how it applies.
Must an employer allow an employee
with a disability to work a modified
or part-time schedule as a reasonable accommodation, absent undue
hardship?
Yes. A modified schedule may
involve adjusting arrival or departure
times, providing periodic breaks,
altering when certain functions are
performed, allowing an employee
to use accrued paid leave, or providing additional unpaid leave. An
employer must provide a modified
or part-time schedule when required
as a reasonable accommodation,
absent undue hardship, even if it
does not provide such schedules for
other employees.
Example A: An employee with HIV
infection must take medication
on a strict schedule. The medica-
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tion causes extreme nausea about
one hour after ingestion, and generally lasts about 45 minutes. The
employee asks that he be allowed to
take a daily 45-minute break when
the nausea occurs. The employer
must grant this request absent
undue hardship.

of her position, operating the printing presses, requires that she work
at night because the newspaper cannot be printed during the daytime
hours. Since the employer cannot
modify her hours, it must consider
whether it can reassign her to a different position.63

For certain positions, the time during which an essential function is
performed may be critical. This
could affect whether an employer
can grant a request to modify an
employee’s schedule. Employers
should carefully assess whether
modifying the hours could significantly disrupt their operations —
that is, cause undue hardship — or
whether the essential functions may
be performed at different times with
little or no impact on the operations
or the ability of other employees to
perform their jobs.

“The Supreme Court views EEOC
interpretations of this type as less than controlling
authority but notes that they ‘constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’”64
However, they do establish the guideposts for how
the administrative agency responsible for enforcing
the ADA views an employer’s responsibility in making
adjustments to work schedules, and the types of cases
the EEOC might choose to pursue.

If modifying an employee’s schedule poses an undue hardship, an
employer must consider reassignment to a vacant position that would
enable the employee to work during
the hours requested.
Example B: A day care worker
requests that she be allowed to
change her hours from 7:00 a.m.–
3:00 p.m. to 10:00 a.m.–6:00 p.m.
because of her disability. The day
care center is open from 7:00 a.m.–
7:00 p.m. and it will still have sufficient coverage at the beginning of
the morning if it grants the change
in hours. In this situation, the
employer must provide the reasonable accommodation.
Example C: An employee works
for a morning newspaper, operating the printing presses which run
between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m. Due to
her disability, she needs to work in
the daytime. The essential function
28

C. The Supreme Court Standard from U.S. Airways,
Inc v. Barnett
Although many aspects of ADA have come
before the Supreme Court,65 only one case addresses
the reasonable accommodation requirement of the
act, U.S. Airways, Inc v. Barnett.66 “Robert Barnett
injured his back while working as a cargo handler for
U.S. Airways and transferred to a mailroom position
that was less physically demanding. Two years later,
Barnett’s position became open for seniority-based
employee bidding, and Barnett learned that employees
senior to him planned to bid for it.”67 At this point,
he became “[c]oncerned that he would be forced to
transfer back to his cargo position.”68 “Barnett asked
U.S. Airways to accommodate his disability under the
ADA by granting him an exemption from seniority
rules so that he could remain in the mailroom.
U.S. Airways denied Barnett’s request, and shortly
thereafter Barnett lost his job.”69
The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for U.S. Airways,
but upon rehearing en banc, the
full panel reversed and remanded.
Rejecting the notion that a seniority system always trumps reasonable
accommodation considerations, the
panel held that the presence of a

THE MODERN AMERICAN

seniority system is merely “a factor
in the undue hardship analysis.” The
panel demanded that courts undertake a “case-by-case fact intensive analysis” to ascertain whether
the requested reassignment would
impose an undue hardship on the
employer. Reviewing the record,
the court concluded that a trial was
needed to resolve the factual dispute
in Barnett’s case. 70
The Supreme Court decided in a 5-4 decision
to vacate the Ninth Circuits en banc ruling and
remanded.71
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer
rejected both parties’ “radically different” views and adopted a compromise position. He began his analysis
by criticizing U.S. Airways’ interpretation of the ADA as requiring only
“equal” (as opposed to preferential) treatment of disabled workers.
On the contrary, the ADA’s focus
on “accommodation” implies the
need for differential treatment, and
therefore “preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the
Act’s basic equal opportunity goal.”
Bolstering this interpretation is the
fact that neither Congress nor the
lower courts have suggested that
neutral work policies—such as neutral furniture budget rules—justify
automatically exempting employers from ADA requirements. The
Court then launched an equally disapproving attack on Barnett’s interpretation of “reasonable accommodation” as “effective accommodation.” It is not enough, the Court
wrote, for an employee to prove
that her proposed accommodation
will effectively meet her disabilityrelated needs. The employee must
also demonstrate that the proposed
accommodation “seems reasonable on its face,” meaning that the
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accommodation would be reasonable “in the run of cases.”
Having concluded that the ADA
may mandate preferential treatment but requires proof of reasonableness, the Court then applied
its analysis to the particularities of
Barnett’s seniority system challenge.
Concurring with other courts, the
majority recognized the beneficial effects of seniority systems on
employee-management relations:
most notably, they cabin management discretion, thereby inducing
employee expectations of fair, standardized treatment. It follows that
employers and nondisabled employees would suffer greatly if courts
granted disabled employees automatic superseniority rights for reassignment purposes under the ADA.
Therefore, the Court held, it would
not “ordinarily” be reasonable for
an ADA job reassignment to trump
seniority rules, and an employer’s
showing that an assignment would
violate the rules of a seniority system would warrant summary judgment for the employer “in the run
of cases.”
But in keeping with its compromise analysis, the Court also held
that an employee could avoid summary judgment by demonstrating
that “special circumstances” exist.
Such special circumstances might
include evidence that the seniority
system already contains so many
exceptions, or is altered unilaterally by the employer so frequently,
that allowing an exception for disabled employees would not significantly alter employee expectations.
Because Barnett had not yet had the
opportunity to make such a showing, the Court remanded the case
for further proceedings.72
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The close 5-4 decision drew a concurrence
and two dissents.73 Justice Souter’s dissent sided with
Barnett, and argued in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s
case-by-case, fact-intensive approach, under which
a seniority system would be merely one factor in
a court’s analysis of undue hardship limitation.74
His dissent notes nothing in the ADA insulates
seniority rules from the reasonable accommodation
requirement which is in marked contrast to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
and Title VII.75 Admitting that statutory silence is
ambiguous, Justice Souter cited legislative history
that used the “factor” formula as evidence to support
his position that seniority rules do not automatically
trump reassignment rights.76
However, the ADA is distinct from other
civil rights statutes due to its emphasis on “reasonable
accommodation.”77
Because Barnett was the Court’s
first stab at interpreting this core
term, one might have expected
the opinion to address the special
implications of the phrase and the
additional responsibilities and costs
employers must assume to respond
adequately to the distinct problem
of disability discrimination. Instead,
the Court treated the ADA as more
of the same—as if in drafting the
ADA, Congress merely intended to
add disability to the long list of classifications already protected by Title
VII and the ADEA, and to restate
the Rehabilitation Act with only
slight modification. Accordingly,
the Court simply imported case law
from other areas of civil rights law
and cited it as persuasive authority
without fully justifying its application to an ADA claim. . . .
To be sure, reasoning by analogy
often drives our legal system forward and is frequently an indispensable tool for statutory interpretation
of recently passed legislation. But a
critical component of reasoning by
analogy is an explanation of why it
is appropriate to treat the issue at
30

bar in accordance with the alreadydecided issue. That the Barnett
majority neglected to include this
component leaves it open to the
charge that it imply overlooked—
instead of considering and rejecting— differences between the ADA
and other antidiscrimination statutes.
The analogies to other civil rights
statutes are especially strained in
light of the evidence that Congress intended the ADA to perform
somewhat differently. As Justice
Souter noted in his Barnett dissent,
Title VII and the ADEA explicitly
insulate seniority rules from the
reasonable accommodation requirement; in marked contrast, the ADA
does not. While the ADA’s silence
certainly does not, on its own,
mandate less deference to seniority
systems under the ADA, legislative
history suggests the possibility. The
House and Senate Reports for the
ADA explicitly limit an employer’s
ability to use collective bargaining agreements to avoid compliance with the ADA. Moreover, the
Senate Report explains that courts
should consider a collective bargaining agreement that reserves certain
jobs for senior employees as only
“a factor” in the decision whether
to require the requested accommodation, and the House Report
clarifies that “the agreement would
not be determinative on the issue.”
Barnett’s presumption that seniority
rights trump the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation provision seems to
ignore these statements.78
“The Barnett Court’s holding is a relatively
narrow one: an employer generally need not
reassign a disabled employee as a reasonable
accommodation if doing so would conflict with the
terms of an employer’s seniority policy, unless special
circumstances justify a different result.”79 As such, it
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does not provide any clear black-letter law on which
to analyze the facts of Colwell v. Rite Aid. As Professor
Befort concludes
The fundamental shortcoming of
the Barnett decision . . . is in the
Court’s failure to provide adequate
guidance for future controversies. The Court is imprecise with
respect to the type of “special circumstances” that will overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness
in requiring a reassignment in the
face of a conflicting seniority system. The Court does not explain
how its ruling will impact the balance of reassignment and other
types of transfer and assignment
policies. The Court fails to articulate
a clear allocation of the burden of
proof responsibilities with respect
to establishing a reasonable accommodation. And, finally, the Court
falls short of demarcating when, if
ever, an accommodation should be
deemed unreasonable by virtue of
the fact that it requires the provision
of preferential treatment for the disabled.
....
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Barnett provides an appropriate touchstone for the unanswered
questions relating to the reassignment accommodation. According to
[her], reassignment is unreasonable
if someone other than the disabled
employee seeking a transfer has a
legally enforceable entitlement to
the position in question. This standard provides a predictable basis
for determining Barnett’s special
circumstances exception to the presumption favoring seniority systems.
More broadly, this standard calls for
an undue hardship-based test for
determining whether reassignment
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should prevail over other types of
transfer and assignment policies.80
D. The Facts of Colwell v. Rite Aid
Jeanette Colwell worked as a part-time
cashier at a Rite-Aid pharmacy81. She would primarily
work weekday shifts from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m.82 Her
personal preferences were listed as 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. or
5 p.m. to 9 p.m.83 During her employment, she was
recognized by her superiors for good performance.84
She subsequently developed a vision impairment
that caused her to lose sight in her left eye; but this
did not affect her ability to fully perform all of the
essential functions of her job.85 Colwell informed her
supervisor that her impairment made it dangerous
and difficult for her to drive at night and requested
that she be assigned only to the day shifts.86 Her
supervisor denied her request, stating that allowing
her to work only day shifts “wouldn’t be fair” to other
employees.87 In the meantime, Colwell had family
members drive her to and from work. Although
she did not miss any work, Colwell claimed this
arrangement posed a hardship to her family, and
renewed her request for a day shift only schedule.88
Rite-Aid continued to schedule her for a mixture of
day and night shifts.89 After unsuccessfully engaging
her union representative in the dialogue, Colwell
ultimately submitted her resignation complaining of
unfair treatment.90
The District Court granted summary
judgment for Rite Aid on the ADA claim, concluding
that while Colwell was an individual with a disability,
she did not suffer any adverse employment action
cognizable under the ADA.91 Specifically, the
District Court found that because Colwell did not
need any reasonable accommodation in order to
perform the essential functions of her job, Rite
Aid had no obligation to consider her shift transfer
request and “had no duty to accommodate her
commute to work.”92 It viewed such a request as
“tantamount to making an employer responsible for
how an employee gets to work, a situation which
expands the employer’s responsibility beyond the
ADA’s intention.”93 On Colwell’s appeal, the Third
Circuit reversed. It held that “as a matter of law that
changing her working schedule to day shifts in order
to alleviate her disability-related difficulties in getting
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to work is a type of accommodation that the ADA
contemplates.”94
E. A Review of other ADA Commuting
cases preceding Colwell
The year before Colwell, a different three
judge panel in the Third Circuit ruled in the
unpublished commuting related ADA case of Parker
v. Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc.95 In this case, Verizon had
conformed to a number of components of Parker’s
accommodation request, but denied a transfer to a
location that would have shorted his commute as
suggested by his physician.96 The Third Circuit stated
that “Verizon’s failure to accommodate Parker by
limiting his commute was not required.”97 With no
Third Circuit precedent on point, the Court cited
two cases from other circuits it found persuasive.98
The first was Kvorjak v. Maine, holding that “the
[employer’s] decision to reject an accommodation
based on [the employee’s] commute does not
demonstrate a disregard for its obligations under the
ADA.”99 The facts and holding are distinguishable
from both Parker and Colwell in that the basis for the
courts decision was actually predicated on Kvorjak’s
inability to perform the essential functions of his job
at home, not that the accommodation requested was
unreasonable because it rose to the level of undue
hardship.100 The second case was LaResca v. American
Telephone & Telegraph, holding that “commuting to and
from work is not part of the work environment that an
employer is required to reasonably accommodate.”101
LaResca suffered from bouts of epilepsy and
therefore could not drive himself to work. Although
he could nonetheless perform all essential functions
of the job, he was denied this accommodation under
the New Jersey State Law Against Discrimination,
not the ADA.102
Another example from a different circuit
decision where the commute to work was excluded
from the potential reasonable accommodations was
in Florida. There, a school guidance counselor was
denied a transfer to a closer school to reduce her
commute in the case of Salmon v. Dade County School
Board.103 The Court reasoned that “the commute to
and from work is an activity that is unrelated to and
outside of her job. While an employer is required to
provide reasonable accommodations that eliminate
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barriers in the work environment, an employer is not
required to eliminate those barriers which exist outside
the work environment.”104
Before Colwell, the only recorded case
going against precedent was the Second Circuit
case Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, which held that
employers must consider an accommodation related
to the commute.105 Lyons was an attorney who was
injured in a near fatal automobile accident, and
her resulting condition severely limited her ability
to walk long distances.106 Because her condition
precludes her from taking public transportation,
she asked her employer to pay for parking near her
office and the courts in which she would practice.107
The court reversed the summary judgment for the
employer, holding that there is nothing “inherently
unreasonable . . . in requiring an employer to furnish
an otherwise qualified employee with assistance in
getting to work,” and remanded the case back to the
trial court to establish a factual record as to whether
this requested accommodation rose to the level of
undue hardship for the employer.108
The Third Circuit in Colwell found the
infrequently cited fifteen year old Second Circuit
Lyons reasoning to be persuasive, stating
At least one other court of appeals
has recognized this principle. In
Lyons v. Legal Aid Society an employee
who suffered severe physical impairments due to a car accident that prevented her from walking long distances sued her employer, Legal Aid,
under the ADA in part for refusing
to provide her financial assistance
to pay for a parking space close to
work. The Second Circuit held that
the employee stated an ADA claim
because, depending on the circumstances, such an accommodation
might be reasonable. Although we
voice no comment on that court’s
holding that a reasonable accommodation could include funds to
pay for an employee’s parking space,
we agree with the court’s observation that “there is nothing inherently unreasonable, given the stated
views of Congress and the agencies
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responsible for overseeing the federal disability statutes, in requiring
an employer to furnish an otherwise
qualified disabled employee with
assistance related to her ability to
get to work.”109

F. The Ninth Circuit follows Colwell
In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit
recently followed Colwell in Livingston v. Fred Meyers
Stores, Inc.110 Similar to Jeanette Colwell, Michelle
Livingston suffers from a vision impairment that
affects her ability to safely drive and walk outside
after dark.111
In the fall of 2005, Livingston’s
supervisor granted Livingston’s
request to work a modified schedule
during the fall and winter months
so that she could minimize driving after dark. In the fall of 2006,
however, Fred Meyer Stores denied
Livingston’s request for a modified
schedule, even though the store had
not experienced any hardship the
previous year when Livingston was
permitted to work under a modified
schedule. In fact, Livingston was
credited with increasing wine sales
and improving the store’s ranking
when she worked under the modified schedule.” When Livingston
refused to work her scheduled shift,
Fred Meyer fired her.112
The Court reversed the district court order
granting summary judgment in favor of the employer
and held that that Livingston had “raised a triable
issue of material fact that Fred Meyer Stores failed to
reasonably accommodate her and failed to engage in
the interactive process in good faith.”113
IV. Other Circuits Should Adopt the
Holding and Reasoning of Colwell
A. The Legislative History of the ADA Compels
Adoption
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Colwell utilizes legislative history to reach the
conclusion that an accommodation for a disability
can extend to the workplace commute. It notes
Congress acknowledged that “modified work schedules can provide
useful accommodations” and noted
that “persons who may require
modified work schedules are persons with mobility impairments
who depend on a public transportation system that is not currently
fully accessible.” …Thus, the ADA
does not strictly limit the breadth
of reasonable accommodations to
address only those problems that
an employee has in performing her
work that arise once she arrives at
the workplace.114
When introducing the ADA, cosponsor
Senator D’Amato specifically noted the daily struggles
that people with disabilities face in getting to and from
work.115 “The barriers the disabled must overcome
in order to meet basic needs are many. Activities
accomplished with ease by most— communicating,
commuting, or entering the workplace—are often
significant hurdles for those with disabilities. This
legisiation (sic), Mr. President, will break down these
barriers once and for all.”116 Congress also considered
that improvements to public transportation would
help people with disabilities commute to work.117
Also, it knew that handicapped parking spaces118
and architectural improvements to the workplace
such as ramps119 would make it possible for people
with disabilities to get into the workplace. Clearly, by
enacting the ADA, Congress was concerned not only
with accommodating workers once they somehow
miraculously arrived inside the workplace, but they
were also cognizant they needed to help people with
disabilities to arrive at exterior of and to enter the
workplace. Commuting to work is an important
prerequisite to reducing the unemployment rate for
people with disabilities, one of the key aims for the
ADA.120
B. Adopting Colwell is Consistent with Current
Workplace Employment Trends and is Sound
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Public Policy
It is well established that “[i]ssues related to
getting to work keep many potential employees with
disabilities from working to their fullest potential,”121
and that the ADA was intended to be construed
broadly.122 Since the employment objectives of the
ADA were never achieved,123 construing the statute
to cover situations such as those that arose in Colwell
can help eliminate a key barrier to accomplishing
those goals.
Outside of the realm of ADA
accommodations,
employers
have
been
accommodating the needs of their employees with
more workplace flexibility. For example, a recent
study found that
[t]here are two changes in the provision of flexibility between 2008 and
1998: 79 percent of employers now
allow at least some employees to
periodically change their arrival and
departure time, up from 68 percent.
In addition, 47 percent of employers allow at least some employees
to move from full-time to part-time
work and back again while remaining in the same position or level,
down from 57 percent.124
Considering work hour flexibility as
a reasonable accommodation for people with
disabilities would not be an unusual accommodation
since it is offered to a large proportion of employees
including those without disabilities. Public policy
would be served by a broad adoption of Colwell.
C. Employers Retain the Undue Hardship Defense
Holding that as a matter of law that
issues related to the workplace commute must be
considered within the realm of possible reasonable
accommodations does not mean that the employer
must automatically accommodate requests such as
those made by Jeanette Colwell; employers still retain
the undue hardship defense.125 “An accommodation is
not reasonable if it would impose an ‘undue hardship’
on the employer’s business.”126 As described in Section
II.B supra, this term ‘undue hardship” is defined in
the statute. “The cost for an employer must be more
than de minimus before the undue hardship test will
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be satisfied. . . . Each case must be decided on an
individual basis.”127
In addition to cost, employer concerns in
providing accommodations also include a threat to
employee morale if some workers are provided with
more flexibility in some workplace rules.
With respect to the impact on other
employees, the undue hardship test
will not be satisfied if the disruption
to them results from fears or prejudices towards the individual’s disability and not from the provision
of the accommodation. Nor is there
an undue hardship if the accommodation negatively impacts on the
morale of the other employees but
does not affect those employees’
ability to perform their jobs.128
The courts have already addressed the issue
of when changes to work schedules such as changing
shifts for non-commute related commutes rise to
the level of undue hardship,129 so determining when
this category of request reaches the level of undue
hardship could be easily integrated with existing
law and employer practices. Also, this reasonable
accommodation-undue hardship determination
requires close attention to the specific facts related to
workplace characteristics for both the employer and
the employee.130 For example, more will be expected
of larger employers, and less of smaller employers.131
Because of the fact specific nature of the inquiry,
juries should be the ones making the determination
of what constitutes undue hardship instead of judges
making a determination about reasonableness as a
matter of law.132
D. Engaging in the Interactive Process on Work
Schedules Makes Good Business Sense
Employers have been providing flexible work
schedules to their entire employee population on an
increasingly frequent basis.133 The benefits of these
flexible work schedules benefit both the employee
and the employer. One example is the Results-Only
Work Environment (ROWE) program implemented
at electronics retailer Best Buy. “The premise of
ROWE is that employees can do ‘whatever
they want whenever they want as long as the work
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gets done.’”134 Although the program was in response
to employee feedback, it also provided benefits to the
employer.135 “ROWE teams at Best Buy report an
average 3.2 percent lower voluntary turnover rates
than non-ROWE teams and employees report that
ROWE has changed their personal and work lives
for the better. ROWE teams are also experiencing an
average 35% increase in productivity.”136 Other studies
have also demonstrated the link between workplace
flexibility, increased employee engagement, and
reduced turnover.137 Another example is that research
suggests that providing employees more flexibility
over their working patterns is likely to improve their
health.138 The improved outcomes were in the areas
of “systolic blood pressure and heart rate, tiredness,
mental health, sleep duration, sleep quality and
alertness and self-rated health status,”139 and was
“also noted in well-being, such as co-workers’ social
support and sense of community.”140
Since technology and workplace expectations
change, employers should not rely on either past
precedent or how they decided internally in a similar
situation in the past. They should engage in the
interactive process with each request for flexibility.
Under the ADA, it is “clear that the [undue-hardship]
burden should be viewed as dynamic, one that
will change over time depending on what courts
and juries consider appropriate as technology and
social expectations change. If the social context
of the statute has any significance at all, it is that
accommodations that seemed beyond the pale
yesterday will be considered ordinary tomorrow.”141
V. Conclusion
In the introduction, this author admits
to using hyperbole in choosing to say that Colwell
“breaks new ground.” Although it is a break from the
case law, the subsequent golf analogy of “replacing a
divot” is also introduced to characterize the change
as a shift back to the original meaning and intent of
the ADA as passed by Congress and signed into law
by President Bush. Colwell and Livingston are simply
returns to an interpretation of the statute in harmony
with Congress’s broad goal under Title I of the ADA
in helping enable people with disabilities participate
in the job market.
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Judge Harold Leventhal is credited with saying
that citing legislative history is akin to “looking over
a crowd and picking out your friends.”142 However,
accommodating needs related to the workplace
commute are not circumstances in which there are
conflicting messages in the legislative history. There
is no evidence that Congress intended to preclude
the commute to the workplace from consideration
as a possible reasonable accommodation; legislative
history and the text of the statute both provide
evidence to the contrary. Judge Slovitier was right
when he wrote in Colwell that “changing Colwell’s
working hour schedule . . . is a type of accommodation
the ADA contemplates. The statute expressly says
so.”143
The ADAAA of 2008 reduced the threshold
for coverage under the act back to Congress’s original
intent two decades earlier.144 With increased coverage,
I anticipate that there will be more opportunity for
employers, and ultimately the courts to decide whether
flexibility related to the workplace commute can be
accommodated without creating undue hardship on
the employer.145 Employers should engage in the
interactive process with employees or applicants with
disabilities that have difficulty with commuting for
two reasons. It not only makes good business sense,
but is also what Congress commands.
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